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ECTION 2711 of the Patent Act provides that".. . whoever without au-
thority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States during the term therefore, infringes the patent." And therein lies
one of the principal mischiefs of the patent law. Ordinarily, a patent owner
who believes his patent to be infringed by a product sues the offending manu-
facturer. If the patent owner prevails, he may have damages2 and an injunction,'
and he is thereby secured in his exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patent
invention. But, as §271 explicitly declares, he is not confined to a remedy against
the manufacturer. He may, if he elects, sue the manufacturer's customers who
"use or sell." And in so doing he may in effect by the very assertion of his claim
of infringement, regardless of its merit, impair the salability of the accused
goods. He thus can achieve for himself or his licensees a competitive advantage
even though his patent may ultimately be declared to be invalid.
Statistically, his patent probably will be declared invalid if a court ever
passes on it.4 Nevertheless, there are profits to be derived even from those
patents which do not survive litigation. There is evidence that some patent
owners assert their patents not to vindicate their rights, but to harass competi-
tors by burdensome patent infringement litigation or by the threat of such
t Member, Chicago Bar.
166 Stat. 811 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §271(a) (1954).
2 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §284 (1954).
'66 Stat. 812 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §283 (1954).
4 So much became apparent in Mr. P. .. Federico's study, submitted to a congressiona]
committee and reproduced in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Committee on The Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Cong. 1st
Sess. 178 (1955), hereinafter referred to as "1955 Hearings." Mr. Federico's tabulations show
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litigation.5 Courts and critics of the patent system have perceived this abuse.
It is recognized that in many instances patents serve not to reward an inventor
or his assignee for a signal contribution to technology, but as an instrument
of unfair competition.
In 1941 the Temporary National Economic Committee observed that patents
had "been used as a device to ... suppress competition"' and to rectify the
situation made the following recommendation:
In order to prevent the use of litigation as a weapon of business aggression rather
than as an instrument for adjudicating honest disputes, we recommend legislation
which will provide that no action, based upon a charge of infringement of any patent
... shall be permitted against... any purchaser... of any article unless the plaintiff
has previously secured a judgment against... the manufacturer of the article for in-
fringement ....
This recommendation has gone unheeded. No such legislation has resulted.
Yet judicial opinions, before and since the TNEC report, show that the courts
are aware of this "business aggression" and have moved to define this abuse
of the patent system as a privately redressable tort.
This article is an effort to analyze the problem and causes of business
aggression by patent, to trace the theory of unfair competition which has emerged
in this context and to suggest the analytic embarrassments of such a theory as
well as its practical limitations. It is the thesis of this article that judicial efforts
to define and redress this business aggression as a private tort have failed as
a means of control because of these limitations, and that the legislation proposed
by the TNEC should be adopted.
The constitutional justification for granting patents is to promote the prog-
the following results on patents adjudicated before the U.S. Courts of Appeal in the years
1948-54.
Numxa VALM AN No? INmIGED
OF INFRINGED INVALID
cIRCUIT PATENTS Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per CET
1 ...................... 26 3 11.5 19 73.1 4 15.4
2 ...................... 39 1 2.6 29 74.3 9 23.1
3 ...................... 40 3 7.5 34 85.0 3 7.5
4 ..................... 46 17 37.0 23 50.0 6 13.0
5 ...................... 30 11 36.7 15 50.0 4 13.3
6 ...................... 65 10 15.4 41 63.1 14 21.5
7 ...................... 95 18 19.0 63 66.3 14 14.7
8 ...................... 24 2 8.4 17 70.8 5 20.8
9 ...................... 45 11 24.5 23 51.1 11 24.4
10 ...................... 32 7 21.9 11 34.4 14 43.7
District of Columbia ...... .. ......
Total ............... 443 83 18.7 275 62.1 85 19.2
Total* .............. 429 77 18.0 269 62.7 83 19.3
* Excluding patents counted more than once.
See notes 6 and 46 infra and accompanying text.
Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee,
Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 36 (1941).
7 Id., at 37,
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ress of science and useful arts.8 Accordingly Congress has provided that "who-
ever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor."' Presumably any invention or discovery which is not
"new and useful" within the meaning of those words as judicially interpreted
or which is inconsonant with the constitutional purpose of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts,10 should not be accorded the patent
reward which serves as the incentive.
Any such reward would constitute an abuse of the patent system. The
likelihood of such abuse will almost inevitably occur when one government
agency is charged with the responsibility of issuing patents within statutory
authority and the courts are charged with the responsibility of reviewing the
agency's decision. The very fact that the patentee's grant of a monopoly may
be annulled in judicial review necessarily creates a shadowy collection of rights,
defeasible by the courts.
The possibility of this abuse will always exist, even assuming that the courts
and the agency apply the same standards to the same evidence. This is par-
ticularly true if the test of validity is but vaguely defined. In the words of
the statute, the question of patentability is whether "the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."'"
Despite repeated efforts to formulate objective tests of invention, the test re-
mains highly subjective and analogous to the reasonable man in negligenc w.
Moreover, the probability of abuse is aggravated to the degree that the issu-
ing and enforcing bodies, i.e., the Patent Office and the courts, apply variant
standards" to determine validity. This divergence has resulted from two causes,
8 United States Const. Art. 1, §8.
9 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §101 (1955).
10 Consider Justice Douglas' argument to the effect that an exacting standard of invention
is constitutionally required, concurring opinion, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Super-
market Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1950).
11 66 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §103 (1954).
"The disparity may not be nearly so dramatic as might be indicated by the statistics shown
in note 4 supra. It is the claims of a patent which measure the scope of the patent. Tilcor
Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1942). The interpretation of these
claims is the essence of the patent lawyer's practice-whether in soliciting the patent, rendering
an infringement opinion, or conducting litigation. And this interpretation is not a matter
alone of simply reading the claim against the accused device or process. Westinghouse v. Boy-
den Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 557-58 (1898). In distinguishing prior art and establishing
patentability, it requires also professional and expert judgment as to the effect of admissions
and concessions made by the patentee or his solicitor, including the cancellation of broad
claims and acceptance of narrower claims, Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club,Inc., 282 U.S.
784, 788-90 (1931); Key Boiler Equipment Co. v. Coleman, 36 F.2d 195, 197 (C.A.lst, 1929);
the addition of limitations to the claims, Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S.
126, 136-37 (1942); or the conclusive definition of terms used, Consolidated Water Power &
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one procedural, the other substantive: (1) the Patent Office is unable to examine
applications with thoroughness, because of its ex parte procedures and the limits
imposed by congressional appropriations; (2) the courts have adopted an
increasingly exacting standard of invention which, it is widely believed, has
not been followed by the Patent Offile.
Even assuming an unlimited budget, the Patent Office is further hampered
by its essentially competing functions of rewarding just claims for a patent,
thus rewarding the true inventor, and resisting unjust claims, thus protecting
the public. In its latter function the Patent Office is handicapped by operating
within its largely ex parte procedures and consequently without the advantages
of a complete adversary contest which the courts enjoy."3
It is generally conceded that the Patent Office, operating within its limited
budget, 14 cannot accord each patent a thorough examination. Consequently,
Paper Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 107 F.Supp. 777 (E.D. Wis., 1952), aff'd 204 F.2d
573 (C.A.7th, 1953); Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc. v. J. M. Huber Corp., 127 F.2d 805, 807-8
(C.A.5th, 1942). Moveover, the claims are "read" and interpreted in light of the prior art,
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1945). However, a claim
which does not by its terms read on an accused device may under the doctrine of equivalents
nevertheless be infringed if the accused device "performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
Regardless of the literal wording of the claims, to discover the meaning of the claims requires
interpretation. Sometimes having narrowly limited the claims during prosecution, the patentee
or his assignee will seek a broad interpretation of his claim in order to make out infringement,
Sager v. Glove Corp., 118 F.2d 873 (C.A.7th, 1941). Yet this broad interpretation will read
on the prior art and consequently invalidate the patent. These available alternative inter-
pretations will sometimes prompt courts to hold patents invalid if infringed but not infringed
if valid, e.g., Horine v. Ethicon, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (D. Md., 1956). In fairness,
the Patent Office cannot be blamed in many such cases, for it has insisted on these limitations
as a condition of issuance; and it is the responsibility of the courts to enforce those conditions.
See Frost, Patent Office Performance in Perspective, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 591, 601-5 (1956).
Whether patents so narrowly restricted should be issued at all, however, is a fair question.
13 See Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 649, 657 (1947):
"Even if the standards were the same, the fact that Patent Office proceedings are ex parte
in nature makes it unlikely that the full facts and implications of the prior art, on the basis
of which the question of invention must be determined, will be brought out. In the courts,
on the other hand, an infringer plays a vigorous role as an opposition party."
14 Throughout the 1955 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 4, it became apparent that the Patent
Office suffers from personnel turnover among its examiners. Moreover, the workload imposed
on each examiner necessarily hampers the thoroughness of his work. As Mr. Donald Brown,
Vice President and Patent Counsel of Polaroid Corp., pointed out: "We believe that the present
shortage of Patent Office personnel makes it impossible for the examiners adequately to search
the art if the work of the Office is to be kept on a reasonably current footing. For example,
it is our common practice, even in fields in which we are reasonably expert, to search the art
before introducing a new product commercially. These searches, which are usually limited
to United States patents of the last 15 or 20 years, may average 4 to 5 days of 1 man's time.
An exhaustive literature search, such as we make if we are charged with infringement of anoth-
er's patent, may run from 10 to 20 days of 1 man's time or even longer. As opposed to this,
it is our understanding that the Patent Office's examiners, on the average, can devote not more
than one-half day to the preparation of each Office action.... We do not believe that it is
possible, even for a skilled examiner familiar with the art, to make an adequate search and
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it is not surprising that many patents are held invalid because defense counsel
in an inter partes patent infringement suit, spurred, as a Patent Office examiner
cannot be, to search the art for anticipating or invalidating reference, often
discover prior art references which the examiner has overlooked. 5
The limitations of ex parte proceedings are most apparent when the argu-
ment for invalidity rests on prior public use'6 rather than on prior publica-
tion. The Patent Office is not adequately equipped to search the art for
prior public uses which do not find recordation in the literature. Often,
the only way in which a public use can come before the Patent Office during
solicitation is through presentation by an opposing party engaged in interference
proceedings' 7 with the applicant. This deficiency has been magnified as some
to consider a new specification or a fairly complete amendment within a period of 3 or 4
hours.... We feel that today much of the technical literature is not searched by the Patent
Office examiners. We know that our own searches invariably develop references which we
believe are closer than those developed by the Office." Id., at 266-67.
As a result of overwork examiners may have developed a tendency to resolve doubts
in borderline cases in favor of the applicant-a not unreasonable attitude. Moreover, patent
solicitors are notorious for their pertinacity; see Davis, Putting Patents to Work, 36 J. Pat. Off.
Soc. 713, 718 (1954): "All of us know that, if you are willing to take excessively narrow claims
and to make a nuisance of yourself around the Patent Office long enough, you can get patents
which have little if any validity in court."
The stubbornness of patent solicitors has not escaped judicial attention. Judge Learned
Hand commented in Lyon v. Boh, 1 F.2d 48,49-50 (S.D.N.Y., 1924), rev'd 10 F.2d 30 (C.A.
2d, 1926): "The case is the common one of needless elaboration of distinctions which are
verbal and details which are trivial. It is absurd to apply in all such cases the rule that claims
must at any cost be treated as patentably differentiated. Courts have descanted upon the
abuse again and again, but the antlike persistency of solicitors has overcome, and I suppose
will continue to overcome, the patience of examiners, and there is apparently always but one
outcome." But Judge Hand's statement elsewhere (not necessarily inconsistent) suggests
that prolixity may be inevitable. Engineering Development Laboratories v. Radio Corp.
of America 153 F.2d 523, 526-27 (C.A.2d, 1946).
" In a study of 40 patents, Mr. Federico found that in six cases the patent was held invalid
over the same prior art patents which had been cited by the examiner, and in thirty-four
cases new references which had not been cited in the Patent Office were "used or referred
to" by the court. 1955 Hearings at 184-85.
16 6 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §102 (1954), provides, in part: "A person shall be en-
titled to a patent unless... (b) the invention was patented or described in aprinted publication
in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States .... "
17 The so-called public use proceedings are provided for in Rule 292 of the Rules of Practice
of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases: "When a petition for the institution
of public use proceedings, supported by affidavits, is filed by one having information of the
pendewy of an application and is found, on reference to the primary examiner, to make a
prima facie showing that the invention involved in an interference or claimed in an application
believed to be on file had been in public use or on sale one year before the filing of the application,
or before the date alleged by an interfering party in his preliminary statement or the date of
invention established by such party, a hearing may be had before the Commissioner to deter-
mine whether a public use proceeding should be instituted." (Emphasis added.)
Patent Office Rule 14 provides that pending applications are preserved in secrecy and that
no information about a pending application will be given out except in unusual circumstances.
Consequently, in many cases the only way in which anyone interested can learn of the patent
19591
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courts have relaxed the burden of proof required to establish a prior public use.
After the Barbed Wire'8 case, it was generally assumed that some surviving piece
of physical evidence of the prior public use was an absolute condition of proof
of the defense. Although some courts have applied the Barbed Wire rule to
this day, 9 other courts wavered on the point," and then held that the same
quantum of proof applied to the defense as to any other. Specifically, oral
testimony alone can be sufficient to prove a prior public use."
It is not merely ex parte procedures and budgetary limitations which have
resulted in the issuance of many patents which have been later declared invalid
by the courts. This has become apparent when one considers those cases in
which the courts, paying obeisance to the statutory requirement 2 that issuance
is a prima facie proof of validity, have invalidated patents on the very same
prior art references over which the Patent Office granted allowance.3 The
explanation must be that the courts are applying a standard of invention dif-
ferent from that employed by the Patent Office.
It is apparent from explicit statements in the cases that the standard of
invention applied by the courts has changed over the years.' 4 The standard
application is in interference proceedings. Even then, no one may be sufficiently interested
in any given patent application to resist its issuance. An interference is a contest between
two applicants in the Patent Office for common subject matter. The only question is one of
priority, not of patentability. Indeed, an interference is declared only after it has been de-
termined that the claims contested describe patentable subject matter.
Rule 291 of the Patent Office provides: "The patent statutes do not provide for opposition
to the grant of a patent on the part of the public. Protests to the grant of a patent are ordinarily
merely acknowledged, and filed after being referred to the examiner having charge of the
subject matter involved for his information."
'1 The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
1s Zachos v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 177 F.2d 762, 763 (C.A.5th, 1949).
20 Cowles Co. v. Frost-White Paper Mills, 174 F.2d 868 (C.A.2d, 1949).
21 Whiteman v. Mathews, 216 F.2d 712, 716 (C.A.9th, 1954); King Gun Sight Co. v. Micro
Sight Co., 218 F.2d 825, 826-27 (C.A.9th, 1955); Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. Dairy & Creamery
Equipment Co., 19 U.S.P.Q. 129, 130 (W.D. Mo., 1933), aff'd 75 F.2d 60, 62 (C.A.8th,
1934); Borkland v. Pedersen, 244 F.2d 501, 503 (C.A.7th, 1957).
"2There is a statutory presumption of validity. 66 Stat. 812 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §282
(1954). The failure of the Patent Office to cite relevant prior art, according to some courts,
diminishes or destroys that presumption. Royal Patent Corp. v. Monarch Tool & Mfg. Co.,
203 F.2d 299, 300 (C.A.6th, 1953); Nordell v. International Filter Co., 119 F.2d 948 (C.A.7th,
1941). But cf. Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 1, 4 (C.A.7th, 1953), which holds
that "it is as reasonable to conclude that a prior art patent not cited was considered and
cast aside because not pertinent, as to conclude that it was inadvertently overlooked."
23 Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kennedy Sporting Goods Mfg. Co., 233 F.2d
280, 282 (C.A.2d, 1956): "It is true that the Patent Office had cited O'Hara as a prior art
reference and notwithstanding found Turner's construction patentable.... We simply cannot
agree.... ." See also note 15 supra.
21 judge Sanborn concurring specially in Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Clinton Machine Co.,
Inc., 247 F.2d 397, 401 (C.A.8th, 1957): "However, as we have pointed out in a number of
cases since the Supreme Court decided Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
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applied is avowedly more exacting. This new standard has been variously de-
scribed as "severe, '25 "exacting," 2 or "rigorous. '27 In thus departing from
an older standard, the courts have conceived themselves to be conforming to
a mandate of the Supreme Court.2 8 It has been argued that one purpose of the
Patent Act of 1952 was to mitigate this "severe" standard of invention formu-
lated by the Supreme Court,29 and to revert to the putatively lower standard
applied in former years. No less an authority than judge Learned Hand sub-
scribed to the theory when he clearly tried to provoke a Supreme Court review
of the question in Lyon v. Bausch & lomb Co.'0 Most Courts of Appeal, however,
Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37, 86 L. Ed. 58, the amount of originality and ingenuity, over
and beyond novelty and utility, which will constitute invention necessary to sustain a patent
for a combination of old elements in a crowded art, has increased." Cf. Murray-Ohio Mfg. Co.
v. E. C. Brown Co. 124 F.2d 426, 428 (C.A.6th, 1942); Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp.,
77 F.2d 274, 276 (C.A.2d, 1935).
25 F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., 194 F.2d 592, 595 (C.A.7th, 1952).
26 Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546, 547 (C.A.2d, 1951).
27 McCord Corp. v. Beacon Auto Radiator Co., 193 F.2d 985, 988, 990 (C.A.lst, 1952).
28 In the Briggs & Stratton case, note 24 supra, Judge Sanborn suggests that the more
stringent standard dates from the Cuno case. Other courts more commonly cite Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950), as the origin. But
in the 1955 Hearings at 120-21, Judge Learned Hand indicated that there bad been an earlier
storm warning:
"MR. CAPL: I wonder if you had any comment on that tendency [of the courts to in-
validate patents] in the last 20 to 25 years?"
"JUDGE HAND: Yes. We have been pretty frank about that in the second circuit.... It
was pretty well accepted, I think, that perhaps 20 or 30 years ago the Supreme Court had
adopted a very much stiffer rule about what was invention. I think it began first with Justice
Brandeis.
"It seems to me it was in the Carbice case [apparently American Patents Development
Corp. v. Carbice Corp. of America, 38 F.2d 62 (C.A.2d, 1930), holding the patent in suit valid
and infringed, reversed on misuse theory, 283 U.S. 27 (1931), and on invalidity, 283 U.S.
420, 421 (1931)]. Judge Swan wrote the opinion. I should think that was all of 20 years ago.
It might be more. That was the first sign, as we understood, that we should watch our steps
and be more severe about what was an invention.
"As it went on, we thought in the second circuit that that tendency was becoming more
and more fixed and although I think, or a good many people thought before at that, we were
much too easy about patents, however, after all we were there to take our orders as we under-
stood them and we understood that we were to be very strict, very severe."
29 See, Lutz, The New Patent Statute: Congress Revitalizes the Patent System, 39 A.B.A.J.
209 (1953); Goodman, The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 upon the Patent
Laws, 35 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 233 (1953); Cf. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act,
35 U.S.C.A., pp. 22-23.
30 224 F.2d 530, 535 (C.A.2d, 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 911 (1955). Judge Hand squarely
posed the issue as to whether the 1952 Act lowered the standard of invention: "On the other
hand, it must be owned that had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps,
twenty-five years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost
certain that the claims would have been held invalid."
Judge Hand stated before the Committee at the 1955 Hearings at 120: "Now when the
Congress passed the act, whether we were right in construing it as meaning that the old
rules were to apply, remains to be seen. I hope the case will go up."
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do not agree with the decision in the Lyon case,3 but, instead, maintain that
the 1952 Act was mere codification and hence did not lower the high standard
of invention.
Whatever the effect of the 1952 Act, the Supreme Court's standard has not
gone unchallenged. It has been adversely criticized by members of the patent
bar, inventors and industrialists who have argued that the standard reflects
a philosophic hostility towards patents on the part of the courts. Legal periodi-
cals32 have abounded with such criticism and protests rumbled throughout the
1955 hearings. 3 Indeed, it has been argued3 4 that the Office, in issuing patents,
has consciously rejected the Supreme Court's standard, an inference which
has also been accepted by some courts.3" In any event, it seems equally clear
31 The late Judge Frank expressed "serious doubts about the correctness" of the ruling
in the Lyon case. Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., 233 F.2d 9,
11 (C.A.2d, 1956), and the same court held that "we have not definitely ruled on the question
in this circuit" in Zoomar, Inc. v. Paillard Products, 258 F.2d 527, 530 (C.A.2d, 1958). The
District Court in Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F.Supp. 342,
350-51 (E.D. La., 1955), order modified 119 U.S.P.Q. 146 (C.A.5th, 1958), declined to follow
the Lyon case: "This standard of patentability is apparently an effort to state in statutory form
what the Supreme Court has held in many cases. If it is an effort, as has been suggested, to
reduce the standard of invention as recognized by the Supreme Court, then that effort must
fall for the reason that the Supreme Court is the final authority on the constitutional standard
of patentability."
Blish, Mize and Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., 236 F.2d 913, 915
(C.A.10th, 1956), allows that it "may well be that the Congress intended to roll back the
philosophical standards of patentability" typified by Cuno and A. & P. See Stanley Works
v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846, 849 (C.A.3rd, 1953); General Motors Corp. v. Estate
StoveCo., 203 F.2d 912, 915 (C.A.6th, 1953). See generally Patents-The Changing Standard
of Patentable Invention: Confusion Compounded, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 985 (1957).
m E.g., Spielman, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Patent Statutes, 36 J. Pat. Off.
Soc. 237, 243; Mann, The Use of Intemperate Language in Patent Decisions, 36 J. Pat.
Off. Soc. 297 (1954), suggesting that some judicial rhetoric "may cloak a latent hostility
toward the subject matter [patents] under consideration."
3"1955 Hearings at 9, 32, 47, 96, 104, 108-109, 138, 236, 243, 249, 259, 263, 300.
34 See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1949).
"See Hanson v. Safeway Stores, 238 F.2d 336, 339 (C.A.9th, 1956); Judge Dawson in
Guide v. Desperak, 144 F.Supp. 182, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y., 1956):
"Why patent claims in their present form were allowed by the Patent Office must remain
a cause for wonderment.... It may be that it is because of this looseness in applying the
standards of the Patent Code that the cynic now all too frequently can say: 'A patent is merely
a license to bring a lawsuit.' This is a negation of the very principles of our Patent Law which
presuppose that a patent is a solemn grant allowed by the government only after strict search
and careful attention to the precise requirements of the Patent Code.
"However, cynics may have some justification when we consider how many patents granted
by the Patent Office are invalidated when they reach the courts. A statistical study [by
Mr. Federico, see note 4 supra].. . would seem to indicate that the Patent Office continues
to spawn patents with little regard for the standards laid down by the courts in interpreting
the Patent Code. How long, it may be asked, would a title company survive if over 50%
of all titles guaranteed by it were held defective when they reached a test in Court. Iow
long could a lawyer expect to retain clients or receive professional acceptance if over 50%
all the opinions which he rendered were declared wrong when they reached the test of Court
proceedings? And yet this, it appears, has been the record of the Patent Office. If so, it is
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that the Patent Office has not enthusiastically accepted the standard of inven-
tion currently applied by the courts and that the courts have not upheld the
majority of patents."
An argument can be made to justify the issuance of patents which will
ultimately be declared invalid by the courts. This argument rests on the con-
viction that innovators generally, as distinguished from inventors, should be
rewarded for their contributions.17 For those who make revolutionary contribu-
tions, patents are available, and the courts will sustain such patents where they
are "pioneer" or where they otherwise meet the severe present day standards
of invention. Still, smaller contributions are made; and while a patent may be
an excessive reward for such small contributions, no other is readily available,
except the initial advantage to the innovator who competes with those who may
copy or adopt his invention. Often such a contribution consists only partially
in the new device itself, and fully as much in the recognition of an economic
need or market.18 This recognition is often in itself a valuable contribution.
The desideratum is that the public is given what it wants. For example, there
are, no doubt, compelling reasons for the high standard of invention enforced
in the A & P case.39 Yet it cannot be denied, either from the record in that
case, nor from any shopper's experience, that the sliding counter pusher, the
patent for which was invalidated in that case, has speeded checking in super-
markets. The devite satisfied a public demand, as its commercial success
attested. Many other examples could be cited.40 To sustain a patent may be
to ignore a high standard of invention but the issuance of the patent may
serve to reward valuable innovations which cannot be adequately rewarded
otherwise.
The argument takes on greater force when one considers the unavailability
of alternative forms of protection. Without patent protection, an innovator
unfair both to those who are issued patents and those who bear the burden of defending
infringement actions. It is equally unfair to the Courts."
In affirming, 249 F.2d 145, 148 (C.A.2d, 1957), the Court of Appeals expressly "disasso-
ciated" itself from these views: ". .. nor are statistical results in cases where the validity of
patents is passed upon by the federal courts an equitable measure of efficiency. Necessarily
those patents whose issuance is subject to doubt will be more frequently questioned in liti-
gation." But see Bergman v. Aluminum Lock Shingle Corp. of America, 251 F.2d 801, 802
(C.A.9th, 1957).
36 See note 4 supra.
37 See judge Holtzoff's opinion and cases cited in Belt v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 108 F.Supp.
689 (D.D.C., 1952), aff'd 210 F.2d 706 (App.D.C., 1953).
38 This consideration may have operated in Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723 (C.A.4th,
1957), where the court sustained a patent on a weeping doll.
31 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
40 See e.g., Paoli v. Marshall Field & Co., 235 F.2d 407 (C.A.7th, 1956) (simple shrimp-
cleaning device, held valid); Crest-Specialty v. Trager, 341 U.S. 912 (1951) (holding invalid
the "piggyfeeder" patent).
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can reap no rewards other than those available in open competition. Without
patents, if he himself makes and sells his invention, it may be freely copied.
If he tries to sell or license his invention, his very disclosure to a prospective
vendee or licensee is hazardous. Since the invention is unprotected by patent,
he must rely upon the fairness of the person to whom the disclosure is made
or upon the very uncertain protection of the law of confidential disclosure.
This common-law doctrine is lamentably uncertain, and proof under the doc-
trine is difficult.41 As a result, many companies will not, as a matter of policy,
accept submission of new ideas absent a patent; and most companies which
do accept them, require a complete waiver beforehand. Since any alternative
protection is so meager, it is quite likely that many patents are applied for,
and granted, in an unconscious effort to do equity to inventors whose contribu-
tions, while not rising to the judicial standard of patentability, deserve some
reward.
To this argument, however, there is the objection that the issuance of so
many patents which cannot stand the test of adjudication in the courts imposes
serious burdens on the business community. So long as the Patent Office
issues many patents which the courts will not enforce, business is ever threat-
ened with some patents "so clearly void that a mere reading thereof requires
judicial declaration of invalidity as a matter of law" 42 and with others, while
not so obviously invalid, too frail to survive litigation.
Even the weakest of patents, "vulgarly dubbed 'zombies' or 'scarecrows' 43
offer a threat to potential defendants. Patent suits are notoriously expensive. 4 4
The services of patent counsel are costly, as are the services of experts whose
talents are usually required in patent litigation. Laboratory facilities normally
devoted to research must be occupied for tests and other activities related to the
lawsuit. Particularly disruptive is the fact that valuable personnel, executive
41 See Problems of Confidential Disclosures with Particular Reference to Large Corpora-
ti6ns-Submitted Ideas, 1 P.T.C.J. Res. & Ed. 286 (1957).
4 Hansen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 238 F.2d 336, 339 (C.A.9th, 1956).
43 Ibid.; judge Frank concurring in Wabash Corp. v. Ross Electric Corp., 187 F.2d 577,
589 (C.A.2d, 1951).
4 Professor Stedman has summed it up nicely:
"Patent litigation is notoriously expensive, complicated, cumbersome and slow. It is
little satisfaction to an 'infringer' of an invalid patent to prove that he had a right to use the
'invention' if he has been ruined, or almost ruined, in the process of proving it. In these
circumstances, a patent may constitute a powerful coercive weapon for a long period before
the courts get around to taking the weapon away.
"The combination of these two deficiencies in our patent system, i.e., the existence of a
large number of spurious patents and the practical difficulty of demonstrating their spurious-
ness, creates a situation that we cannot be complacent about. If issued patents were on the
whole valid, cumbersome court proceedings for determining invalidity would not be too
serious. Conversely, if court proceedings were simple, expeditious, and inexpensive, error in
the issuance of patents could easily be corrected. But the situation, as it stands, is comparable
to that of an oppressed people who can obtain no redress for their injuries." Stedman, Invention
and Public Policy, 12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 649, 658 (1947).
See also Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
634, 635-37 (1950).
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and technical, suffer interruption of their customary productive work in order
to allocate time and work to the lawsuit. There are, in addition, the costs of
going to trial since the money saving expedient of summary judgment is rarely
available. 45
In short, the burden of a patent lawsuit itself can overwhelm a defendant
quite as much as losing it. Mr. Allen B. DuMont, President of DuMont Tele-
vision Corp., testified at the 1955 Hearings: 4
The way the patent system works out in many cases-and I have not any suggestions
for improving the thing-but it has happened that many times in the past the cor-
poration with a large group of patents can put a smaller company out of business, not
because he does not have good patents, but simply by suing him on the patent and
losing the suits, but costing the particular company $25,000 or $50,000 to defend those
suits. I know of cases specifically where that has happened. And I think it is pretty
much of a general practice where if you have a large group of patents that may not
apply to the particular companies, but they can enforce the patents, by costing the
smaller companies money that they cannot afford in lawsuits.
That has been in my estimation one of the negative parts of the patent system. I
do not know how you would get around it. It is something that is quite prevalent.4
Confronted with any patent lawsuit, the defendant is presented with several
alternatives: He may discontinue production of the infringing item or use of
the infringing process. In that event, his investment in developing his product
or installing his process is sometimes lost and at best competition with the
patentee or the patentee's licensees is diminished. He may be able to obtain
a license, if the patentee will offer it to him. 48 Even so, the royalty must be added
41 Professor Moore in his treatise speaks of the "uphill fight" to establish that Rule 56
is applicable to patent cases. 5 Moore, Federal Practice 56.17[44] (2d ed., 1953). See also
Van Brode Milling Co. v. Kravex Mfg. Co., 21 F.R.D. 246, 249 (E.D.N.Y., 1957), and cases
there cited.
46 1955 Hearings at 101-2.
47 Commissioner Watson was quick to disclaim responsibility for the situation on the part
of the Patent Office:
"Well, I was simply going to volunteer the comment that the evil of which Mr. DuMont
has spoken is without jurisdiction of the Patent Office. As I understand it, he refers to a large
and wealthy corporation using perhaps unfairly a mass of patents as a threat to corporations
of less accumulated capital, who cannot stand litigation. Perhaps, that is an evil which is
not limited to patents. Perhaps there are other fields of litigation in which those corporations
engage, and by reason of their financial strength, are able to dominate the situation and scare
the smaller ones. I have heard of those instances but in any event, there is no right on the part
of the Patent Office to refuse any patent to a corporation, large or small, provided the invention
is of such character as to merit the issuance of the patent." 1955 Hearings at 102.
48 The courts have acknowledged that patent licenses are often taken, not as tribute to
the validity or worth of the patent, but as a cheaper alternative to litigation. Judge Hand
observed in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Osber & Reiss, 109 F.2d 917, 922 (C.A.2d, 1940): " .. it is
often less troublesome to buy one's peace from a possessor of many patents, than to enter into
a long-drawn and expensive litigation." Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. U.S. Rubber
Co., 79 F.2d 948, 954 (C.A.6th, 1935), cert. denied 298 U.S. 679 (1936); Girdler Corp. v.
Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 24 F.Supp. 551, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1938), aff'd 106 F.2d 998 (C.A.3rd,
1939); United Specialties Co. v. Industrial Wire Cloth Products Corp., 186 F.2d 426, 429
(C.A.6th, 1951); John E. Thropp's Sons Co. v. Seiberling, 264 U.S. 320, 329-39 (1924).
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to the price of his product; and his competitive position will be correspondingly
impaired. He may also fight the lawsuit or settle the case by buying the patent
asserted, if he has the money.
The manufacturer's problems are aggravated when the patent owner re-
peatedly accuses the manufacturer of infringement, publicizes his accusation,
but does not file suit. The manufacturer may continue to sell, run the risk of
accruing damages, and hope that the controversy does not intimidate his cus-
tomers. He may also file suit for a declaratory judgment invalidating the
patent or at least clearing his product of the infringement charge.
Before the enactment of the Declaratory judgment Act,49 the manufacturer
was virtually helpless. Sometimes he could only stand by impotently while
a patent owner repeatedly accused him of infringement, and while his customers,
seeking profits instead of lawsuits, declined to take more of the accused goods.
The manufacturer's only recourse was an action for unfair competition which
was difficult to maintain, since it required proof of bad faith or malicious
intent. Today if threats are made, the manufacturer may bring an action
for declaratory judgment and settle the question."0 However, what constitutes
a "threat" which will constitute a justiciable controversy is a question which
has vexed the courts for some time and is still not free from doubt5
4948 Stat. 955 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. §§2201-2 (Supp. 1958).
50 At first blush, it might appear either that the ability of the manufacturer to sue for a
declaratory judgment would prevent harassment or that an indemnification agreement would
completely reassure his customers. Practically, this is not the case. For one thing, the accused
goods may be highly desirable, but the manufacturer's financial position might be such that
his customers would not feel confidence in the indemnification agreement. Secondly, business-
men simply do not wish to become involved in a lawsuit. The manufacturer may well give
pledges of indemnification in which his customers do have confidence, but reimbursement
may not compensate the customer for time lost by executives or employees who may be
called as witnesses nor for adverse publicity attending the lawsuit. Finally, and most important-
ly, even where the manufacturer sues for declaratory judgment, the lawsuit may not reach
adjudication for many months; and during these months the manufacturer may sustain
irreparable damage. Consider the case where bids are invited for a large construction contract,
the patent owner and a competing manufacturer respond, and the patent owner alleges that
the competitor's installation would infringe its patent. The buyer in such a case is likely
to take the patent owner's bid, and the manufacturer will have lost valuable profits by the
time the patent is adjudicated invalid or non-infringed. Mr. Borkin has pointed out that
".... markets of a defendant in patent litigation may easily dry up and disappear or be diverted
beyond recall during pendency." Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial,
17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 634, 641 (1950).
51 justiciable Controversy under the Federal Declaratory judgment Act and the Exercise
of Patent Rights, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 63 (1953). The earlier cases took a very restrictive
view of the explicitness required to present a "justiciable controversy." The earlier view
has been relaxed: Remington Products Corp. v. American Aerovap, 97 F.Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y.,
1951), aff'd 192 F.2d 872 (C.A.2d, 1951), held that a justiciable controversy existed even
where dispute occurred before issuance of the patent, and Welch v. Grindle, 251 F.2d 671,
678 (C.A.9th, 1957), held: "The courts have repeatedly held that actual manufacture, use o
sale is not essential and that it is sufficient that the party charged is about to infringe or to take
some action which is prejudicial to the interests of the patentee." For an example of the
difficulty prior to the Act, see Electropure Sales Corp. v. Anglim, 21 F.Supp. 451 (W.D.N.Y.,
1937).
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This problem of accusing a competitor is serious enough when the accusation
is communicated to the manufacturer alone. But the manufacturer and his
counsel can at least evaluate the patent owner's claim, and make his decision
to honor or reject it. The problem, however, acquires another dimension when
the patent owner publicizes his infringement claim to the trade and particularly
to the customers of the accused manufacturer. It is with this problem that
the remainder of the article will be concerned.
As soon as the infringement claim is announced to the trade, a cloud en-
cumbers the product whether in the hands of the manufacturer or his customers.
In effect, a lien is asserted against the goods. No matter how expressed, even
the mildest of such notices poses the threat of a lawsuit. Direct threats of
suits are not uncommon. Patent owners sometime circularize the trade with let-
ters, 2 alleging certain articles to infringe and thus putting the trade on notice
that anyone who sells the item will be liable. Less directly, the patent owner
may publish a general notice in a trade journal" or at a trade show, 4 or his
salesmen in their rounds may make accusations.
The effect upon customers is invariably detrimental to the manufacturer
of the allegedly infringing item. The customer may discontinue all sales and
liquidate or return his inventory. More commonly, the customer will demand
an indemnity which guarantees to save the customer harmless from all damages
and to defend against any lawsuit.Ps Large department stores and chain stores
frequently demand such an indemnity clause in their contracts as a matter
of course. In cases where the patent owner sues several customers so indemnified,
such agreements can compel the manufacturer to defend all of them.
These threats against customers primarily have force because of the pos-
sibility that the patent owner may sue the customer before he sues the manu-
facturer. If this possibility did not exist, the customer would have the assurance
that he could not be forced to bear the expense and inconvenience of suit
and that he could not become liable at all unless the patent owner had first
vindicated his claim against the person best able to defend5 6 Conceding these
52 E.g., Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (N.D.Ill., 1888) (circulars); Hall v. Wright, 125 F.Supp.
269 (S.D.Cal., 1954), aff'd 240 F.2d 787 (C.A.9th, 1957); International Industries and De-
velopments, Inc. v. Farbach, 145 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.Ohio, 1956), aff'd 241 F.2d 246 (C.A.6th,
1957); Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311 (C.A.2d, 1950).
53 E.g., Panay Horizontal Show Jar Co. v. Aridor Co., 292 Fed. 858 (C.A.7th, 1923)
(semble); Rhodes Pharmacal Corp. v. Dolcin Corp., 91 F.Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y., 1950).
54 E.g., Robbins v. Ira M. Petersime & Son, 51 F.2d 174,178 (C.A.10th, 1931); Tele-Sonic
Pkg. Corp. v. Errich Int. Corp., 121 U.S.P.Q. 171, 177-178 (S.D.N.Y., 1959).
65 See note 50 supra. Sometimes the patent owner will also declare in his publicity to the
trade that the manufacturer will not so stand behind his product or is financially unable to.
United Kingdom Optical Co. v. American Optical Co., 68 F.2d 637 (C.A.lst, 1934).
56 There is the possibility that a successful suit against a financially responsible manufac-
turer will preclude subsequent suits for damages against the manufacturer's customer. It
has been held that a successful suit against a manufacturer precludes subsequent action against
the manufacturer's customers for lse, Wagner Sign Service v. Midwest News Reel Theatres,
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various effects upon the manufacturer's business, and conceding that the manu-
facturer, as source of the infringing item, is the logical person against whom
the patent owner's wrath should be directed, 7 it is reasonable to ask whether
there are legitimate reasons for allowing an infringement action against a cus-
tomer.
Several reasons have been advanced as to why the patent owner should
be allowed to assert his claim against the trade. (1) The manufacturer may
reside outside the United States, leaving only the customer within reach of the
patent law. In such a case, the patent owner may not be able effectively to
enforce his rights at all without suing the customer. 8 If the manufacturer wishes
to join the contest, he may intervene. (2) The customer may be solvent and the
manufacturer financially irresponsible. As a practical matter, this situation
is unlikely to occur. In some cases, courts have enjoined suits against customers
where the defendant manufacturer has been able to establish financial respon-
sibility by posting a bond.59 (3) The customer may be reached in a venue more
convenient to the patent owner. While there is an ancient presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's right to select venue, this right is not absolute but
must be balanced against inconvenience to the defendant."0 (4) The customer
may be reached in a venue in which a patent owner feels the courts to be
more charitable toward patents. 61 Some circuits in fact do seem to be more
119 F.2d 929 (C.A.7th, 1941). In Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Webber Co., 284 Fed. 331
(C.A.8th, 1922), the court allowed a subsequent action against a customer for resale. It is
possible to argue that §284 of the Patent Act, 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §284 (1954),
now dictates a contrary result. See generally, Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 113
(1922); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978 (C.A.6th,
1937).
r7 See Maytag Co. v. Meadow Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (C.A.7th, 1929).
58 It is clear, however, that the patent owner has sufficient protection against the foreign
manufacturer even if suit against the domestic customer is not permitted. Under Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 703, 19 U.S.C.A. 1337(a), (e) (1937), the President
has power to exclude from entry articles who importation would result in unfair competition.
The President's action is to be based on an ex parte investigation by the Tariff Commission,
whose findings may be appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 19 U.S.C.A.
1337(c) (1937). The phrase "unfair competition" was early held to justify exclusion of imports
infringing an American patent. In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447, 455 (C.C.P.A.,
1937). In 1940 Congress extended Section 337 protection to process patents. 54 Stat. 724,
19 U.S.C.A. 1337(a) (Supp., 1959). Since the issue of the validity of a duly-issued patent has
been held to be outside the scope of the appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(See In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 444 [C.C.P.A., 19551), the patent owner's position
is stronger than it would have been had the infringer been within the reach of the patent laws.
19 Bechik Products, Inc. v. Flexible Products, Inc., 225 F.2d 603 (C.A.2d, 1955). See also
note 56 supra.
:0 Courts have repeatedly made this clear in motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C.A. §1404.
1 There may be something to this: Mr. Federico's tables, note 4 supra, show that in the
period 1948-54, of the patents litigated in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 37% were
held valid and infringed; in the Fifth, 36.7%; in the Second, 2.6%; and in the Third, 7.5%.
But box scores on judicial decisions are of questionable value. Who can deny authoritatively
that only "weak" patents appeared before the Second and Third Circuit Court of Appeals
and "strong" patents in the Fourth and Fifth?
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favorable to patents in comparison with other circuits, but this is too doubtful
a premise for argument, and there is no more reason why the patent owner
should be entitled to a favorable judiciary than the defendant. (5) The patent
owner may wish to move against the customer whose interest is slight in com-
parison with that of the manufacturer and who is therefore likely to contest
the suit less vigorously, if at all. Having fortified his patent with the judgment
thus obtained, the patent owner may then move on against other customers
or ultimately against the manufacturer himself. It is doubtful whether this
technique will be successful . 2 In any event, since a patent confers monopoly
rights, it is reasonable to argue that as a matter of policy the law should
seek to provide the strongest possible contest rather than token or no resist-
ance.63 (6) Finally, the patent owner may wish to intimidate the trade, to scare
customers away from dealing in the accused product, and thus to achieve a
competitive advantage. This is the "business aggression" of which the TNEC
disapproved. The courts know of the abuse and have moved cautiously against
it within the constraints of traditional conception of unfair competition.
The degree to which courts have succeeded in this endeavor is, however,
open to question. The simplicity and directness of the legislative solution
proposed by the TNEC requires a detailed analysis of the judicial efforts to
control this abuse.
Undoubtedly, Emack v. Kanp4 is the leading and fountainhead case acknowl-
edging as an abuse the use of patents merely to threaten litigation. Emack and
Kane manufactured and sold noiseless slates used by school children. Kane
widely circulated the trade, accusing Emack's slates of infringement and brought
three infringement suits against Emack's customers. In each of the three
suits Emack assumed the defense and Kane thereupon voluntarily dismissed.
Emack then brought his bill to restrain Kane from sending out accusing circulars,
and the injunction was granted.
Judge Blodgett knew he was dealing with an uncommon cause of action.
He acknowledged the necessity of distinguishing earlier authorities forbidding
an injunction or "prior restraint" against slander. This he accomplished by
62 A holding of validity and infringement against one defendent is not res adjudicata against
another, but it is persuasive, Priebe & Sons Co. v. Hunt, 188 F.2d 880, 882 (C.A.8th, 1951),
although apparently not persuasive on issues not contested in the previous case, American
Engineering Co. v. Stoker Castings & Service, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 96 (D.Mass., 1942). But cf.
Gordon Johnson Co. v. Hunt, 96 U.S.P.Q. 92, 93-4 (N.D. Ohio, 1952).
63 Consider Borkin's argument that while economic inequality is a condition of nearly
all litigation and so recognized by lawyers, such inequality is of grave concern in patent
litigation because a patent suit is "predominantly a problem in public interest." Borkin,
The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 634, 635 (1950).
" Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (N.D.Ill., 1888).
e5 The courts have also distinguished this rule in commercial disparagement cases. See
Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 Yale L. J. 1304, 1035-6 (1938).
One of the leading cases for the old rule is Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384,
64 N.E. 163 (1902).
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drawing a distinction between "mere personal slander or libel" and injury
to property:
It shocks my sense of justice to say that a court of equity cannot restrain systematic
and methodical outrages like this, by one man upon another's property rights....
Redress for a mere personal slander or libel may perhaps properly be left to the courts
of law, because no falsehood, however gross and malicious, can wholly destroy a man's
reputation with those who know him; but statements and charges intended to frighten
away a man's customers, and intimidate them from dealing with him, may wholly
break up and ruin him financially, with no adequate remedy if a court of equity can-
not afford protection by its restraining writ.66
Judge Blodgett did not explain the "property rights" which he enforced.
Perhaps he meant the property in the good will of a going business."7 But Judge
Blodgett was apparently not embarrassed by theoretical difficulties. The
rhetoric of his opinion reveals a sense of outrage and he translated his outrage
into judicial legislation.
The case can be read as formulating a theory of trade slander or libel; but
theory aside, Judge Blodgett saw clearly the effect of a business practice
which he thought reprehensible:
No businessman wants to incur the dangers of a lawsuit for the profits which he may
make as a jobber in handling goods charged to be an infringement of another man's
patent. The inclination of most business men is to avoid litigation, and to forego even
certain profits, if threatened with a lawsuit which would be embarrassing and vexa-
tious, and might mulct them in damages far beyond their profits; and hence such per-
sons, although having full faith in a man's integrity, and in the merit of his goods,
would naturally avoid dealing with him for fear of possibly becoming involved in the
threatened litigation.... Instead of going to the courts to test the validity of the
Butler patent, or the right of complainant to make the kind of slates he was putting
upon the market, the defendant, in a bullying and menacing style, asserts to the trade
by these circulars that complainant is infringing the Goodrich patent, and threatens
all who deal in complainant's slates with lawsuits, and all the perils and vexations
which attend upon a patent suit. The average business man undoubtedly dreads, and
avoids, if he can, a lawsuit of any kind, but a suit for infringement of a patent is so
far outside of the common man's experience that he is terrorized by even a threat of
such a suit.68
6 Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46, 50-51 (N.D.Ill., 1888).
67 Clearly the theory of Judge Kennamer in Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273
(N.D.Okla., 1931): "It is a well-established rule, in the absence of statuory authority, that
courts are without jurisdiction to enjoin a libel or slander.... I cannot agree with the conten-
tion that this is an action to enjoin a libel or slander. The gravamen of the action here is to
enjoin the defendant from committing acts constituting unfair competition, and from destroy-
ing the business of the complainant. An established business, with the good will thereof, con-
stitutes, property, the owner of which may invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent
its unlawful and wrongful destruction, where the legal remedy is inadequate to redress the
wrong."
68 Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46, 51-52 (N.D.III., 1888).
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Judge Blodgett's decision clearly turns on a finding of bad faith and that may
evidently be equated with malice. Significantly, Judge Blodgett found it un-
necessary to consider whether the patent was valid or invalid. And since the
Emack case, bad faith has been an indispensable element for relief in such cases.6 9
But to make bad faith the criterion is of little help. Barring some incredibly
improbable admission against interest or an unlikely disclosure during discovery,
a patent owner will seldom be convicted of bad faith from his own mouth.
As in any other proof of intent, the courts must nearly always look to circum-
stantial evidence. The courts have conceded as much, e.g., in Adriance, Plait
& Co., v. National Harrow Co. 70
The question of whether the patent owner is acting in good faith in advertising his
claims to the manufacturer's customers by circulars or letters can seldom be deter-
mined from the contents of the communication alone, and, like all questions of intent,
must generally be determined by the extrinsic facts. It is always easy to frame such
circulars in guarded terms, which will not commit the sender to any definite libelous
charges, omitting specific statements of fact, and substituting statements of opinion;
and when they are sent for an illegitimate purpose they are likely to be so framed.
As one might expect, courts have avoided formulating any comprehensive
test or set of tests. But some kinds of incriminating evidence have been men-
tioned frequently enough that some objective guides, at least, can be inferred.
Judge Blodgett in the Erack case was impressed by the fact that the patent
owner did not sue, but continued to threaten the trade. This is a clear-cut
criterion.71 It was applied in the Adriance case:
As, ordinarily, the patent owner would be prompt and zealous to assert his claims,
if he halts and purposely procrastinates, and attempts to effect by threats and mani-
festoes that which he can compel by the strong hand of the law, a strong inference
arises that he has not any real confidence in his pretensions. This inference becomes
irresistible if he refuses to bring suit during a considerable period of time when the
alleged infringement is open, notorious and defiant, and so extensive as to threaten
destruction of his alleged exclusive rights.7 2
61 A. B. Farquhar Co. Ltd. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (C.A.3rd, 1900); Chandler
v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 135 F.2d 885 (C.A.7th, 1943); Cheney Co. v. Cunningham, 37 F.Supp.
224 (W.D. Pa., 1941), aff'd 127 F.2d 294 (C.A.3rd, 1942); Coats Loaders & Stackers, Inc.
v. Henderson, 233 F.2d 915 (C.A.6th, 1956); Stephens Products Co. v. Fillum Fun, Inc..
99 F.Supp. 649 (E.D.N.Y., 1951); United States Galvanizing & Plating Equipment Corp.
v. Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co., 104 F.2d 857 (C.A.4th, 1949).
70 121 Fed. 827, 830 (C.A.2d, 1903).
71 Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311, 314 (C.A.2d, 1950), suggests that delay
in bringing suit is not alone sufficient to establish bad faith, but most be "coupled with other
evidence indicating a lack of honest belief in the legal rights asserted." Cf.Salem Engineering
Co. v. National Supply Co., 75 F.Supp. 993, 1001 (W.D.Pa., 1948); Coats Loaders & Stackers,
Inc. v. Henderson, 223 F.2d 915 (C.A.6th, 1956), holds that prompt filing of suit after notices
is affirmative evidence of good faith. Cf. Celite Corp. v. Dicalite Corp., 96 F.2d 242 (C.A.9th,
1938) (a publicity campaign together with delay in filing suit makes the inference of bad
faith "inescapable").
72Adriance, Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827, 830 (C.A.2d, 1903).
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But this criterion has become virtually obsolete since the enactment of the
Declaratory judgment Act. 3
Courts have also inferred bad faith where the patent owner has asserted
an unjustifiedly broad construction of his patent claims. But in the abstract
such an inference is difficult to justify. The interpretation of patent claims
requires a highly sophisticated and technical professional judgment.7 4 It is
not enough to read the claim and compare the device: The face value of the
words may be changed as interpreted in light of the specification of the patent,
prior art, and the file wrapper.
It is difficult to object to the inference of bad faith in those rare situations
where accusations of infringement are made against those who do not make,
sell, or use in any form the invention as claimed, and the courts will not coun-
tenance such accusations. For example, the plaintiff in American Ball Co.
v. Federal Cartridge Corp.75 owned a patent which covered the machines used
in manufacturing steel shot for'air rifles. Notwithstanding, he sent notices to
defendant's customers, who purchased only the shot itself. The court acknowl-
edged infringment notices to be commendable in proper cases, but went on
to say:
We think it clear that any dealer in such shot receiving this letter would naturally
conclude therefrom that appellant intended to proceed or might proceed against him
for sale by him of the shot purchased from appellee company if the patentees were suc-
cessful in its litigation against appellees. At the very least, he would be left in doubt as
to such being the intention of the appellant.... To place them under any justified ap-
prehension of litigation was going much beyond what appellant was entitled to go in
protection of its rights. Appellant would have been entitled to inform these recipients
that it had filed suit against appellees and expected to prevent the sale of shot by them
and that, if this happened, the dealer would be deprived of this source of supply and
might be embarrassed thereby.76
The rule of the American Ball case is relatively easy to apply; allowing
for the special jargon of patent claims, not even a layman could mistake a claim
covering only a machine to cover also the product of that machine. But it
is far less justifiable to infer bad faith where, despite the vagaries of patent
claim interpretation, a patent owner has merely asserted that a patent claim
is broader than the court in its interpretation77 finds it to be.
71 See note 50 supra. 74 See note 12 supra.
.- 70 F.2d 579 (C.A.8th, 1934).
76 d., at 582. Accord: Hall v. Wright, 125 F.Supp. 269 (S.D.Cal., 1954), aff'd 240 F.2d
787 (C.A.9th, -1957); Metro-Goldwin-Mayer v. Fear, 104 F.2d 892 (C.A.9th, 1939).
77 I4 nia Iorizontal Show jar Co. v. Aridor Co., 292 Fed. 858 (C.A.7th, 1923); Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Dolcin Corp., 91 #.Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y., 1950). Cf. Shingle Product
Patents, .Inc. v. Gleason, 211 F.2d .437 (C.A.9th, 1954). Analogous are cases where courts
find that while the patent owner has obtained a valid decree againstone defendant, he has
wrongfully nisrepresented the scope of the decree to others. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham
& Straus, Inc,, 62 F.2d 79 ,(C.A.2d, 1932); Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. Co., 299 Fed. 19 (C.A.lst,
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Here then is the second criterion: Did the patentee in threatening litigation
assert an unjustifiedly broad scope for his patents? In cases like American Ball,
the rule is useful; but in cases where the scope is clearly in doubt until after
adjudication, the rule must necessarily be applied with great caution simply
because the interpretation of claims requires highly professional subjective
judgment.78
The third criterion is whether the patentee has actually studied the accused
product or process to determine whether there is infringement. This objective
test was applied recently in International Industries and Developments, Inc.
v. Farbach Chemical Co.79 The plaintiff owned a patent on a dip-type liquid silver
cleaner. Without notice to defendant who manufactured such a cleaner,
plaintiff mailed 8,000 letters to the trade stating that defendant's product was
not licensed; that any persons selling such unlicensed silver cleaners did so
at their peril; and that infringers would be prosecuted. The trial court found
that although defendant's cleaner was readily susceptible of chemical analysis,
plaintiff had made none. This, together with plaintiff's failure to introduce
evidence at trial to support charges of infringement, constituted unfair com-
petition, and cost plaintiff $100,000 in damages and $15,000 in attorney's fees.
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.80 also falls within this test. This case involved
a counterclaim for violation of the Sherman Act. The defendant alleged,
1924); Price-Hollister Co. v. Warford Corp., 18 F.2d 129 (S.D.N.Y., 1926); Rollman Mfg.
Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, 238 Fed. 568 (C.A.3rd, 1916); United Kingdom Optical
Co. v. American Optical Co., 68 F.2d 637 (C.A.lst, 1934). Even in such cases, bad faith
must be proved. National Metal Molding Co. v. Tubular Woven Fabric Co., 236 Fed. 745
(C.A.lst, 1916); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Stanley Co. of America, 42 F.2d 904
(D.Del., 1930). Even so, such misrepresentations will sometimes not be restrained, even
through they are "extravagant," Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 113 Fed. 615 (C.A.lst, 1902),
or relate to "trivial" matters, Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28 (C.A.2d, 1940), cert. denied 311
U.S. 718 (1941). See also A.B. Farquhar Co., Ltd. v .National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714
(C.A.3rd, 1900) (false statements that defendant's patents have been sustained in adjudicated
cases); Adjusta Co. v. Alma Mfg. Co., 36 F.2d 105 (S.D.N.Y., 1929) (false implication that pat-
ent case had been decided on merits, but had been decided only on jurisdictional issues).
78 Cf. Circle S Products Co. v. Powell Products, Inc., 174 F.2d 562 (C.A.7th, 1949) (unfair
competition because of infringement notices issued before patent issued.) See also note 12
supra. Accordingly, a patentee in advance of adjudication is not "bound to know" that
his patent is invalid over the prior art. Oil Conservation Engineering Co. v. Brooks Engineering
Co., 52 F.2d 783, 786 (C.A.6th, 1931). Cf. Stadium Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Plymouth Pajama
Corp., 24 F.Supp. 779 (D.Mass., 1937), and Judge Kohisaat's opinion in Racine Paper Goods
Co. v. Dittgen, 171 Fed. 631, 635 (C.A.7th, 1909): "Even though there had been infringement,
the exasperating delay to make its character known would be persuasive evidence of malice.
If there was no .infringement, the maliciousness would be undoubted."
The Dittgen case was disapproved in the Oil Conservation case. See also Atlas Underwear
Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347 (E.D.Wis., 1913) (defendant was restrained from
falsely representing, inter alia, that his patent on union suits was "pioneer"), and Kobre
v. Photoral Corp., 100 F.Supp. 56, 59 (S.D.N.Y., 1951) (attempt to impress trade "with a
far broader patent that Photoral actually had.")
79 145 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.Ohio, 1956), aff'd 241 F.2d 246 (C.A.6th, 1957).
80 198 F.2d 416 (C.A.10th, 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S.837 (1952).
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inter alia, that the plaintiffs conspired to pool the controlling patents covering
hydraulic oil well pumps. When its competitor appeared with a new pump
plaintiffs filed suit although they "had no concrete information that the
Dempsey pump infringed any of Kobe's patents. Drawings or models of it
had never been examined by or been in Kobe's possession." Accordingly,
the court found that the plaintiff's assertions of patent rights to the trade
were made in bad faith, and defendant prevailed.81
From these cases if is difficult to escape the conclusion that as long as bad
faith is an essential element of proof, business aggression can be controlled
through private remedies only in a very limited number of cases. Moreover,
under present law, there are two additional obstacles to effective control:
(1) difficulty in proving damages for injury previously incurred, and (2)
judicial timidity resulting from lack of an adequate legal theory to cover
the wrong.
Once it is determined that a patent owner has engaged in business aggres-
sion, a federal court has sufficient remedial powers to restrain such conduct
in the future. A variety of remedies are available.8 2 However, patent litigation
81 United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F.Supp. 304, 312 (E.D.Mich., 1951), aff'd 343
U.S. 444 (1952), presented a similar question in the context of a criminal prosecution.
82 The courts have denied relief to a patent owner on the theory of unclean hands where
the patent owner has threatened to sue or sued in bad faith. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham
& Strauss, Inc., 62 F.2d 79 (C.A.2d, 1932); Hall v. Wright, 125 F.Supp. 269 (S.D.Cal., 1954),
aff'd 240 F.2d 787 (C.A.9th, 1957); Panay Horizontal Show Jar Co. v. Aridbr Co., 292 Fed.
858 (C.A.7th, 1923); Rollman Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works, 238 Fed. 568 (C.A.3rd,
1916); Salem Engineering Co. v. National Supply Co., 75 F.Supp. 993 (W.D.Pa., 1948);
Powell v. Pratt Chuck, 24 F.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y., 1927) (Defendant had infringed, but changed
to non-infringing structure. Accounting denied because of plaintiff's "unethical conduct'-
in sending out letters alleging infringement and threatening lawsuit.)
The courts may also enjoin the patent owner's further harassment of the trade. Adriance,
Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C.A.2d, 1903) (restraining publication of
circulars and letters, or threatens customers of lawsuit); Everybody's Tool & Die Works, Inc.
v. Costa, 9 F.Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y., 1934) (notices to trade permitted but only with copy
of patent and full title of case); Gardner Sign Co. v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 36 F.2d 827
(W.D.Pa., 1929) (restraining further letters and circulars, requiring plaintiff to send copy
of injunction to all persons to whom original circulars sent, and publishing decree in news-
papers.); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Fear, 104 F.2d 892 (C.A.9th, 1939); Price-Hollister Co.
v. Warford Corp., 18 F.2d 129 (S.D.N.Y., 1926) (restraining letters and circulars respectina
suits filed or to be fied, ordering copy of injunction mailed to "various persons in the trade
who may be affected thereby"); Remington Products Corp. v. American Aerovap, 97 F.Supp.
644 (S.D.N.Y., 1951), aff'd 192 F.2d 872 (C.A.2d, 1951) (enjoined pending trial from "pub-
lishing, advertising or otherwise disseminating in any manner any statements to the effect
that the Remington vaporizer is not reliable or is unsafe"); Thomas French & Sons, Ltd. v.
Carleton Venetian Blind Co., 34 F.Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y., 1940) (restraining "circulars and
all forms of communications... on the subject of these litigations"); Milburne Mills v. Meister,
37 F.Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y., 1940) (advertising that defendant infringed plaintiff's design
patent restrained, but defendant also restrained from advertising that plaintiff's patent
invalid). Cf. Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Supply Mfg. Co., 193 Fed. 658
(E.D.N.Y., 1911).
The courts may enjoin additional lawsuits against customers pending the outcome of
an initial lawsuit. Remington Products Corp. v. American Aerovap, 97 F.Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y.,
1951), aff'd 192 F.2d 872 (C.A.2d, 1951). For this relief, proof of bad faith is not necessary.
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., Inc. v. National Electric Products Corp., 125 F.2d 1008
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is protracted; and in the considerable period of time between the initial acts
of business aggression and final adjudication, the accused manufacturer has
continued to sustain injury."3 While courts will sometimes grant damages 4
upon facts which support an injunction, aside from occasional allowance of
attorney's fees 5 the manufacturer's ability to obtain redress is most uncertain.
There are few reported cases on accounting in such situations. Apparently
the applicable rule is that one may be allowed damages on sales lost which would
have been made but for the interference by the patent owner in threatening the
trade or potential customers.8 " In cases involving heavy industrial machinery
such as printing presses, rolling mills, or aeration systems for purification of
sewage, where each loss represents a substantial sum, this rule of damages
is feasible.* But in cases of fungible, mass-produced, high-volume merchandise,
it is often impossible to find the potential customers who did not buy and
then to prove that these customers did not buy because of the patent owner's
harassment.
As important as the problem of damages is, it is no more important than
the reluctance of the courts to take any action at all. In part this reluctance
(C.A.3rd, 1942). But cf. Arkay Infants Wear v. Kline's, Inc., 98 F.Supp. 862 (W.D.Mo.,
1950): "Only in rare circumstances should a patent holder be compelled to stand aside in one
court until he litigates the validity of his patent in some other court, even though he has several
such actions presently pending against the various direct infringers or dealers." See also
Dorr Co., Inc. v. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co., Inc., 32 F.Supp. 193 (E.D.La., 1940).
The courts may restrain further suits and accusations of infringement once the accused
manufacturer's product is cleared of the infringement charge. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S.
285 (1907); Vermont Structural Slate Co., Inc. v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., Inc., 253 F.2d 29
(C.A.2d, 1958).
81 See note 50 supra.
84 Robbins v. Ira M. Petersime & Son, 51 F.2d 174, 178 (C.A.10th, 1931); Ferrocart Cor-
poration of America v. Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 151 (N.D.Ill., 1943); Adriance,
Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C.A.2d, 1903); International Industries
and Developments, Inc. v. Farbach Chemical Co., 145 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.Ohio, 1956), aff'd
241 F.2d 246 (1957); Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. Co., 299 Fed. 19 (C.A.lst, 1924). None of these
cases gives the theory on which damages should be awarded. Landstrom v. Thrope, 189
F.2d 40 (C.A.8th, 1951), an analogous trademark case, places upon the aggrieved party the
heavy burden of proving the loss of particular customers, general loss of business, and direct
causation. The unreported judgment decree in the Ferrocart case shows that $46,511.72
was awarded as damages, but the theory of damages is not apparent.
- 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §285 (1954), provides that "[tihe court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." This has been interpreted
as permitting awards against the patent owner as well as the accused infringer. See Interna-
tional Industries and Developments, Inc. v. Farbach Chemical Co., 145 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.Ohio,
1956), aff'd 241 F.2d 246 (C.A.6th, 1957); Shingle Product Patent, Inc. v. Gleason, 211
F.2d 437 (C.A.9th, 1954). In Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d
445 (C.A.3rd, 1951), the court acknowledged that the legislative history of the section showed
that "[tihe provision was designed to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer," but dis-
allowed attorney's fees because the District Court had made "no findings setting forth the
reason for the award." Id., at 451.
8 See note 85 supra. See also Trade Disparagement and the "Special Damage" Quagmire,
18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 114 (1950).
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stems from a conviction that patent owners should have wide latitude in giving
bona fide notices of infringement, 7 but also it is due to the fact that the wrong
does not fit comfortably into any traditional classification of torts. In acting
against business aggression by patent, courts have rummaged among a wide
variety of legal theories.88 This confusion as to a respectable legal theory
often prompts courts to deal with each case empirically, avoiding discussion
of theory, to enter orders without opinion, or to classify the wrong within
the amorphous body of law known as unfair competition. Under these circum-
stances, not only is predictability at a minimum, but there is the danger that some
judges, either from a conservative disposition or from a fear of reversal, will
abstain from action altogether.89
The TNEC recommended legislation abolishing the patent owner's oppor-
tunity to bring infringement action against customers prior to an action
against the manufacturer.9 0 A present solution is obviously to be preferred over
8 While the emphasis in this discussion has been on the patent owner's wrongdoing,
Judge Learned Hand has in Gillman v. Stein, 114 F.2d 28,32 (C.A.2d, 1940), excoriated infring-
ers who seek to evade liability because of minor defects in the patent-owner's notices to the
trade: "Particularly in actions on patents it has become the favorite gambit of infringers; they
pick over the patentee's advertisements-often, it is true, not drawn with scupulous nicety,
as advertisements seldom are-and find, as they frequently can, departures from the untar-
nished truth. These ought not to give them their escape. No doubt it would be desirable to
repress the exuberance of over-statement by which so much of our marketing is done, and
there are tribunals charged with that duty; but we are not disposed to give the initiative
to those who are themselves preying upon the delinquents, at least so long as the delinquency
is confined to such trifling misconduct as was shown in this case."
And courts have repeatedly affirmed that to give reasonable notices is the right of the pat-
entee. Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913). It has been held that once a patent
has been held valid, a patent owner is "strictly within his rights" to charge customers with
infringement. Northwest Engineering Corp. v. Keystone Driller Corp., 70 F.2d 13,19 (C.A.7th,
1934), aff'd 294 U.S. 42 (1935).
88 Some courts seem to consider the wrong, as one of defamation. Emack v. Kane, 34
Fed. 46 (N.D.Ill., 1888); Robbins v. Ira M. Petersime & Son, 51 F.2d 174, 178 (C.A.10th,
1931); Adriance, Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C.A.2d, 1903); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer v. Fear, 104 F.2d 892, 899 (C.A.9th, 1939) (trade libel); Oil Conservation
Engineering Co. v. Brooks & Co., 52 F.2d 783, 785 (C.A.6th, 1931) (".. . in the nature of
libels or slander of title; possibly they are analogous to a cloud upon the competitor's title
to his business and to his output"). Other tort theories have been suggested: Virtue v. Creamery
Package Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913) (malicious prosecution); Panay Horizontal Show Jar Co.
v. Aridor Co., 292 Fed. 858 (C.A.7th, 1923) (abuse of process); Electropure Sales Corp.
v. Anglim, 21 F.Supp. 451 (W.D.N.Y., 1937) (tortious interference with contract); Beh & Co
v. Bedal, 36 U.S.P.Q. 136, 139 (N.D.Ohio, 1937) (defendant's "conduct can probably be
better called interference with plaintiff's business than unfair competition... "). See also
Law of Commercial Disparagement: Business Defamation's Impotent Ally, 63 Yale L. J.
65, 74, 86 (1953); The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent Infringers, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
328, 353 (1958); and Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Laboratories, Inc., 146 F.Supp.
21 (S.D. Cal., 1956).
89 See Shingle Product Patents, Inc. v. Gleason, 211 F.2d 437 (C.A.9th, 1954), where the
District Court refused to sustain the counter-claim for unfair competition despite a finding
that the patent owner had been guilty of bad faith in circularizing the trade. Even had full
attorney's fees been awarded defendant's injury would not have been fully redressed, assuming
only that the patent owner's conduct was not totally ineffectual.
90 See text following note 6 supra.
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the present system of postfacto relief. Save in exceptional cases, 9' such preven-
tive legislation will work no hardship upon a patent owner. A suit against
the manufacturer allows a full adjudication of validity and infringement.
If the patent is found valid and infringed, the owner can recover full damages
in the same action assuming that the defendant is solvent.2 If the manufacturer
is insolvent, then the patent owner would be permitted to move against cus-
tomers.93 If, however, the patent is held invalid or if the manufacturer's
products are held not to infringe, then his customers are by present rules of
res judicata freed from the threat of lawsuit.9 4 In addition, the court will in
one lawsuit be able to enter all protective orders necessary to prevent harass-
ment of the trade until the patent owner's claim is adjudicated.
91 See note 58 supra. Injustice could be avoided by permitting exceptions within the dis-
cretion of the trial court.
92 For a further possibility see note 56 supra.
3 See note 59 supra.
9' Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907). Except'in such a case, however, the holding of
validity or invalidity in a suit against one defendant is not res judicata against another
manufacturer or his customer. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638,642-44 (1936); Bulldog Electric
Products Co. v. Cole Electric Products Co., 148 F.2d 792, 795 (C.A.2d, 1945) ("Another party
could be sued on the claim or claims previously held invalid."); Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Wa-
ters, 185 F.2d 193, 195-96 (C.A.Sth, 1950).
Judge Schnackenberg, concurring in Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949,951 (C.A.7th, 1955),
said: "He is entitled [to sue again] because a suit testing the validity of a patent is not a
proceeding in rem and hence Aghnides may litigate and relitigate again and again the question
of validity of a patent as long as he selects a different defendant in each of the infringement
suits which he files, thus avoiding the wholesome doctrine of res adjudicata. This queer result
is one which we are unable to avoid. It is a situation which is particularly abhorrent when con-
sidered against the backlog of untried cases which clogs our federal courts. The latter are cases
where the litigant asks only for his day in court, not a plurality of days in court as Aghnides
is entitled to under the existing law. The remedy lies not in our hands. The congress could
by legislation grant relief."
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